UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-9-2018

Marsalis v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45583

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Marsalis v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45583" (2018). Not Reported. 4687.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4687

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
10/9/2018 10:08 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JEFFREY MARSALIS,

)
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
NO. 45583
)
v.
)
Blaine Co. CV-2016-194
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
)
________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
________________________
HONORABLE JONATHAN P. BRODY
District Judge
________________________
GREG S. SILVEY
Silvey Law Office Ltd
P.O. Box 5501
Boise, Idaho 83705
(208) 286-7400

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

ATTORNEY FOR
APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................1
Nature of the Case ....................................................................................1
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................2
ISSUE...................................................................................................................6
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................7
The Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing the Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief Based on Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel ...........................................................................................7
A.
Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal .......................7
B.
Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ........................................8
C.
Cumulative Error ................................................................9
D.
The Claims and the Court’s Ruling ....................................9
1) Failure to object to the state’s expert testimony
on intoxication and/or to call a defense expert ..............9
a) Petitioner’s claim and the evidence in the
post-conviction ..........................................................9
b) The district court’s characterization of the
issue .........................................................................18
c) The district court’s ruling .......................................18
d) The court erred in dismissing this claim ...............20
2) Failure to call a witness favorable to the defense .......27
a) Petitioner’s claim and the evidence in the
post-conviction ........................................................27
b) The district court’s ruling .......................................29
c) The district court erred in dismissing the
claim ........................................................................30
3) Failure to advise Petitioner of the time limits
for trial in the Interstate Agreement on
Detainer statute and the remedies available for

i

breach of that statute ...................................................31
a) The claim and the arguments in the postconviction.................................................................31
b) The district court’s ruling .......................................35
c) The district court erred in dismissing this claim ..38
4) Cumulative instances of ineffective assistance
of counsel ......................................................................45
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................46
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE .......................................46

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696 (Ct. App. 2015) ......................................................9
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599 (2009)............................................................39
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).................................................................8
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 (Ct. App. 1991) ...............................................7
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct. App. 1994)...........................................7, 8
Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct. App. 1994) .................................................7
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995) ...................................................8
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989) ........................................................8
State v. Knauff, 115 Idaho 74 (Ct. App. 1988) ............................................42, 45
State v. Richardson, 163 Idaho 523 (Ct. App. 2018) ........................................42
Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396 (Ct. App. 2013) .................................................9
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ..................................................8
Other Authority:
I.C. § 19-4901 .......................................................................................................7
I.R.C.P 56 .............................................................................................................7
I.R.E. 403......................................................................................................21, 24
I.R.E. 702................................................................................................ 21, 22, 24

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeffrey Marsalis (hereinafter Appellant/Petitioner and/or Mr. Marsalis)
appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based
on three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a rape supposedly
occurring in October of 2005 and prosecuted in 2009.
First, Appellant asserts that the district court erred in summarily dismissing
his claim that trial counsel should have objected to expert testimony extrapolating
BACs of the complaining witness and him using a formula and then determining
how the alcohol affected them based on a chart. The district court did not even
discuss the affidavits of Petitioner’s expert witnesses opining that the prosecution
expert’s methods were scientifically unreliable. The court then dismissed his
alternative claim that defense counsel should have called his own expert witnesses,
holding that defense counsel cross-examined the state’s expert so Petitioner would
have not been in any materially different position if had he called his own experts.
Second, the district court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s claim that
defense counsel should have called a known and interviewed witness who
controverted important witnesses of the state regarding the condition of the
complaining witness during a cab ride. The district court erred when it made
credibility determinations and also confused the legal standards.
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Third, Petitioner alleged that his attorney failed to advise him that the
speedy trial clock under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was 120 days and
not 180 days, so his speedy trial waiver was not knowing. The state argued that
Petitioner’s waiver was valid. The district court summarily dismissed this claim on
a ground not raised by the state, to wit, that the speedy trial right was not Mr.
Marsalis’ to exercise and that counsel validly waived it. Since there was no notice of
this grounds for dismissal, this claim must be remanded.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The published opinion in this case in the direct appeal, State v. Marsalis, 151
Idaho 872, 264 P.3d 979, (Ct.App. 2011), describes the following facts as being
shown to the grand jury:1
Marsalis and K.G., who became acquainted through their work at Sun
Valley, arranged to go to a bar in Ketchum for a drink. Having already
consumed one beer, K.G. rode with Marsalis to the bar, where they
each drank a beer. Marsalis told K.G. that she was prettier than her
sister, which made K.G. uncomfortable because it gave her the
impression that Marsalis believed they were on a date. She testified
that she was not interested in Marsalis as a sexual partner.
After the two finished their beers, Marsalis ordered a shot of liquor for
each of them and refused to tell K.G. what was in it. She testified that
the drink had a slightly bitter or salty taste and that there was a
grainy substance left on the bottom of the glass. After a trip to the
The state in its Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Disposition recites the following facts without citation to the opinion, but refers to
them as being shown both at the grand jury and at the jury trial. (R. p. 338.)
1
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restroom, K.G. drank another beer that Marsalis had ordered for her.
She testified that after drinking this beer, her recollection became
spotty which was unusual because she could normally drink three to
four beers and a shot of alcohol without experiencing memory
problems. Testimony of the bartender established that Marsalis had
ordered a total of twenty beers and four shots for the two of them, and
K.G. had also ordered a few beers for herself.
Following several hours of drinking, Marsalis and K.G. took a cab back
to Sun Valley. The cab driver testified that K.G. appeared to be very
intoxicated and that during the ride, she was curled up with her eyes
closed. The driver also said that Marsalis had a difficult time rousing
K.G. and getting her out of the cab once they reached their
destination—Marsalis' condominium building.
K.G. testified that she had no recollection of how she left the bar or
came to find herself at Marsalis' residence, where she woke up the next
morning. Upon waking, she did not know where she was and saw that
Marsalis was in bed next to her. She was sick and vomited several
times that morning, felt pain when urinating, and felt like her vagina
was "bruised." She also noticed that her clothes had been put on in a
different order than she remembered wearing them the night before.
K.G. spent the rest of the day feeling sick. That night she reported to
Ketchum police officers that she thought she had been raped, and she
then went to a hospital where samples of her blood and urine were
taken. . . .
Marsalis was arrested for rape, and the State sought an indictment
from a grand jury.
Id., at p. 873-874.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, where additional evidence was
presented, including DNA test results showing that semen found
during a sexual assault examination of K.G. was from Marsalis. The
jury found Marsalis guilty of rape. He now appeals, challenging only
the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.
Id., at p. 875.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed.
As explained in the Memorandum and Order on Motion for Summary
Dismissal (hereinafter Order), after the jury found Mr. Marsalis guilty as charged of
one count of rape, the court sentenced him to life with the first 15 years fixed. (R. p.
577.) This term is consecutive to a sentence of 10½ years for sexual assault that
Mr. Marsalis is currently serving in Pennsylvania. (R. p. 577.)
After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Mr. Marsalis timely filed a
verified petition for post-conviction relief. (R. p. 18-35.)
Petitioner requested the court take judicial notice of various parts of the
criminal case file, including the trial transcript, which the district court granted.2
(R. p. 48, 91.)
After lengthy proceedings in the district court which are not relevant to the
issues herein, a verified Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(Second Amended Petition) was ultimately filed, the dismissal of which is at issue
here. (R. p. 280-316.) The state filed an answer. (R. p. 327-334.) The state also filed
a motion for summary dismissal and an amended memorandum in support. (R. p.
335-337, 338-391.) Petitioner filed a response to the state’s motion for summary
judgment. (R. p. 412-447.)

The state filed what it captioned Second Amended

Appellant likewise has contemporaneously filed a motion to take judicial notice of
the trial transcripts.
2
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Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition of Second Amended
Post-Conviction Application (Second Amended Memorandum). (R. 454-555.)
Petitioner then filed a Reply to the State’s Amended Memorandum to Dismiss the
Second Amended Petition (Reply). (R. p. 556-573.)
The district court held oral argument on the motion for summary dismissal
and took the matter under advisement. (R. p. 574-575.)
The court granted the state’s motion to dismiss in a written order. (R. p. 576588.) A separate judgment was entered. (R. p. 596-597.)
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 589-592.)
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ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BASED ON
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED BY SUMMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BASED ON INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901 is civil in

nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the criminal action which led
to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994).

In order to

prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based. Id.
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment
under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable inferences made in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759
(Ct.App. 1991).

Allegations contained in the verified petition are deemed true for

the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.
Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).

If the allegations do not frame a

genuine issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily dismiss,
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but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct
an evidentiary hearing. Id.
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was properly
granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to
petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle petitioner to relief.
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995).
B.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is well

established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The
"benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686.
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in order
to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different.

Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129

(1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).
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More specifically as to allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
tactical decisions, the Court of Appeals explained in Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396
(Ct. App. 2013):
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or
strategic decisions of counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance
of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.
There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within
the wide range of professional assistance.
Id., p. 385-386 (internal citations omitted).
C.

Cumulative Error
“Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of

themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.” Bias v. State, 159
Idaho 696, 705 (Ct. App. 2015).
D.

The Claims and the Court’s Rulings
Mr. Marsalis’ claim for relief was ineffective assistance of counsel with three

subparts as well as a cumulative error claim. One subpart, that he was deprived of
his right to testify, was not pursued below. The three subparts will be fully
addressed below in turn.
1)

Failure to object to the state’s expert testimony on intoxication and/or
to call a defense expert
a)

Petitioner’s claim and the evidence in the post-conviction
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Petitioner succinctly explained the problematic testimony of the state’s
expert witness at trial in the Second Amended Petition:
21. Counsels' performance was deficient because they failed to
challenge the testimony of Marc LeBeau regarding the complaining
witness's and Mr. Marsalis's blood alcohol concentration.
22. At trial, Marc LeBeau testified for the state.
23. Mr. LeBeau estimated the complaining witness's blood alcohol level
by the use of the "Widmark formula." He did the same for Mr.
Marsalis.
24. Using the Widmark formula, Mr. LeBeau estimated that, under
one set of assumptions, the complaining witness's blood alcohol
concentration peaked at about 1:30--2:30 a.m., and was about
approximately .28.
25. Mr. LeBeau then testified that according to the "Dubowski chart,"
the complaining witness would have been in a "stupor," which meant
she had lost motor function, had reduced response to stimuli, such as
being touched, had impaired or loss of consciousness, or would have
fallen asleep.
26. Mr. LeBeau also testified that Mr. Marsalis's blood alcohol
concentration during the same period peaked at about a .16.
27. Mr. LeBeau testified that, according to the Dubowski chart, Mr.
Marsalis, at a .16 blood alcohol concentration, would have been in a
state of "excitement," which is associated with the loss of judgment and
some memory impairment, but not blackouts or amnesia.
28. Thus, according to Mr. LeBeau, at the time Mr. Marsalis and the
complaining witness arrived at Mr. Marsalis's home, the complaining
witness was incapacitated due to alcohol consumption and could have
fallen asleep or been unconscious when sexual intercourse occurred.
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29. At the same time, according to Mr. LeBeau, Mr. Marsalis would
have been conscious, but with impaired judgment, and would have
been able to recall the events of the evening the next day as Mr.
Marsalis was short of the stage where blackouts or memory loss would
have occurred.
30. All the testimony above supported the state's allegation that Mr.
Marsalis had sexual intercourse with the complaining witness at a
time she was asleep or unconscious due to her excessive alcohol
consumption. It also rebutted the defense theory of the case, i.e., that
the complaining witness was awake and consented to sexual
intercourse, but had no memory of the event due to voluntary
intoxication.
31. This evidence should not have been admitted under I.R.E. 702
because estimation of blood alcohol levels using the Widmark formula
is not scientifically reliable.
32. Even assuming the admissibility of the evidence, trial counsels'
performances were deficient because they failed to contradict or
impeach Mr. LeBeau's testimony with evidence that estimation of
blood alcohol concentration using the Widmark analysis is not
scientifically reliable.
33. Further, trial counsels' performances were deficient because they
failed to challenge the admissibility of the testimony regarding the
Dubowski chart. There is no Idaho authority finding the Dubowski
chart sufficiently reliable enough for admission into evidence.
34. Further, trial counsel did not consult with or obtain the testimony
of a defense expert on the issues about which Mr. LeBeau testified.
Had such an expert been contacted, that expert would have testified
regarding the admission of the Dubowski chart, and if admitted over
objection would have testified that Mr. LeBeau's testimony about the
effects of alcohol were speculative and not supported by the evidence in
this case.
35. Had the jury not heard Mr. LeBeau's testimony in the above
regard, or had the jury heard that Mr. LeBeau's conclusions were
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derived from unreliable methods, and had the jury heard from a
defense expert, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would
have acquitted Mr. Marsalis.
Second Amended Petition, p. 4-7. (R. p. 283-286.)
Attached to the Second Amended Petition was an article from The Champion
concluding that underlying uncertainties characterizing retrograde extrapolation of
blood alcohol levels using the Widmark formula renders it scientifically unreliable.
Petitioner argued that in the instant case, the problems with retrograde
extrapolation were exacerbated because Mr. LeBeau attempted it without a BAC
test to use as a baseline. (R. p. 288.) Rather, the estimate of the BACs above was
not based on any sort of known BAC based on a test because no blood alcohol tests
were performed on either K.G. or Mr. Marsalis. Rather, the estimates were entirely
based on the bar tab and witness testimony and assumptions such as that all drinks
were consumed and the tab drinks were divided equally.
In response to the State’s motion for summary disposition, Petitioner asked
D. Timothy Anstine, Ph.D., a tenured Associate Professor of Chemistry and Chair of
the Chemistry Department at Northwest Nazarene University, to study the
reliability of the Widmark formula and the Dubowski chart in determining blood
alcohol concentrations (BACs) and associated actions. (R. p. 432-433.)
According to the affidavit of Dr. Anstine (Exhibit A), the Widmark formula is
a simple formula to calculate the percentage of blood alcohol content. It takes the
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ounces of alcohol consumed and the time it was consumed in, the weight of the
person and a predetermined alcohol ratio “r” which is .73 for the average male and
.66 for the average female. (R. p. 434).

Kurt Dubowski, Ph.D., determined the

ranges for males to be 0.60 to 0.87 and females 0.54 to 0.85. (R. p. 434.) The actual
alcohol ratio “r” for an individual is generally unknowable. (R. p. 434.) Even with
this limitation, this formula is considered scientifically relevant when used with
individuals with known variables.
More recently, programs such as AlcoTrace used by Mr. LeBeau are used, but
are still based on the Widmark formula and can add things such as whether the
person is a novice, average or experienced drinker and factor in meals. (R. p. 434435.) However, estimating an individual’s BAC is still subjective since there are a
myriad of parameters affecting it such as body mass index, dehydration, altitude,
body temperature, time of day, and regularity of alcohol consumption, to name a
few. (R. p. 435.) “Therefore, extreme caution must be used when the subjective
results of a hypothetical if not arbitrary range of values from a Widmark calculation
are generated.” Anstine Affidavit, para. 4. (R. p. 435.)
The affidavit next explained that Dubowski developed a well-known chart
that attempts to correlate the clinical signs and symptoms caused by alcohol and
classify them into stages and overlapping ranges. (R. p. 435.)

Dr. Anstine warned

that “great caution” must be used in assessing stages of alcohol influence as each
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individual is unique and how different individuals are affected has enormous ranges
of influence. (R. p. 436.) The scientific assessment of an individual’s actual BAC is
very complex due to the wide range of the person’s unique physiological and
biochemical parameters, so it is not a good scientific practice to rely too heavily on
any single technique.

Rather, it is best to look at multiple overlapping, albeit

subjective, techniques. (R. p. 437.)
Dr. Anstine concluded:
7. In the case of Mr. Marsalis, the state did not have blood or breath
analysis, nor did it have any video or audio files. To my knowledge the
State relied solely on Dr. LeBeau's Widmark calculations that he based
off a bar tab and eye witnesses to establish a possible level of
intoxication for both Mr. Marsalis and [K.G.]. From these highly
subjective assumptions he estimates a BAC of 0.28 for [K.G.], peaking
at around 1:30-2:30 a.m. He likewise estimates a BAC of 0.16 for Mr.
Marsalis around the same time. From these very crude and subjective
estimations, Dr. LeBeau makes sweeping conclusions about their
"stage of alcoholic influence" based solely on the highly subjective
Dubowski charts. In one of his published articles, Dr. Dubowski says,
"In forensic practice, expert witnesses are often requested to engage in
speculative retrograde extrapolation of an experimentally found BAC
to an assumed BAC at a prior time. In addition to the uncertainty of
the presumed post-absorptive state during the entire extrapolated
interval, the assumed linearity and regularity of the BAC decrease
with time are also open to serious challenge in any given individual
instance. When these considerations are coupled with the established
unpredictable occurrence of the steepling effect in the BAC time curve
and with the wide range of the elimination rate, it becomes clear that
the speculative retrograde extrapolation of the BAC to any point from
an experimentally determined value must be avoided in forensic
practice, or so qualified by stated assumptions that the exercise
becomes pointless." (Dubowski K. M. Alcohol Technical Reports,
1976,5: 55-63). Dr. LeBeau's statement that [K.G.] would have been in
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a "stupor" and Mr. Marsalis would have been in a state of "excitement"
is pure speculation and not based on any objective scientific facts.
8. In summary, it is my opinion that the State relied too heavily on one
single technique, specifically the Widmark formula, and from these
speculative calculations made sweeping assumptions, based on the
Dubowski chart, concerning the levels of intoxication and its influence
on Mr. Marsalis and [K.G.]. Scientifically, there is no way to know
either of their levels of intoxication with any accuracy or certainty
based solely on Widmark calculations. Without knowing their level of
intoxication, any discussion concerning the "stages of alcoholic
influence" is complete speculation.
Affidavit of Dr. Anstine, para. 7-8 (emphasis added). (R. p. 437-438.)
Also filed in response to the state’s motion for summary dismissal was the
affidavit of Kim Fromme, Ph.D. (Exhibit B). Dr. Fromme is a Professor of Clinical
Psychology at The University of Texas at Austin where he teaches courses that
focus on psychological disorders, substance use, memory, and personality
assessment and specializes in the effects of alcohol intoxication on cognitive
processes, especially alcohol-induced blackouts. (R. p. 439.)
Dr. Fromme explained that alcohol-induced blackouts are amnesia for all or
part of a drinking episode. This is anterograde amnesia, meaning memory loss for
events occurring after alcohol intake. (R. p. 442.) Blackouts also involve
impairments in episodic memory, specifically memories for the emotional, spatialtemporal, and social context of events (e.g., where you were, what events
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transpired). There is no evidence that any other cognitive abilities are necessarily
impaired while in a blackout. (R. p. 442.)
Alcohol-induced blackouts may be fragmentary, which is amnesia for parts of
a drinking episode which may later be recalled with appropriate cues (K.G.’s report
of snippets here or there) or an en bloc blackout which is amnesia for an entire block
of time during the drinking episode (K.G.’s report of waking up on a bare mattress).
(R. p. 442.)
A person in a blackout is able to engage in complex activities, including
engaging in conversation, driving, or having sexual intercourse, they are simply not
forming memories for those events. (R. p. 442.) There are no observable signs that
another person is in a blackout, so their actions may be seen as conscious and
volitional to an observer. (R. p. 442.)
K.G. testified she had previously experienced blackouts when she drank
which is important because only about 50% of drinkers experience blackouts,
indicating she is genetically predisposed to having alcohol-induced blackouts. (R. p.
442-443.)
Dr. Fromme concluded:
13. I conclude with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that
[K.G.] was experiencing both fragmentary and en bloc blackouts
during the night of October 9, 2005 and the early morning hours of
October 10, 2005. This conclusion is reached when considering her
reported failure to remember events which others observed, such as
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consuming additional Bud Lights and the taxi ride to Mr. Marsalis'
residence, as well as her estimated blood alcohol concentrations (BACs)
by Dr. LeBeau. Whereas blackouts can occur at BACs as low as .07 g%,
most occur at BACs of .15g% and higher (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003).
Affidavit of Dr. Fromme, para. 13. (R. p. 443.)
Dr. Fromme had the additional opinions regarding Mr. LeBeau’s report and
the Dubowski chart:
14. I have reviewed Dr. Mark LeBeau's report for his BAC estimations
and opinions about [K.G.’s] physical and mental capacity. Dr. LeBeau's
BAC estimations for five hypothetical amounts of alcohol consumption
were based on [K.G.s] self-report, a bar record of sales, and a
bartender's recollection of drinks purchased on the night in question.
BAC estimations based on self-reports or eyewitness reports are of
questionable validity because memory is a reconstructive process that
is highly susceptible to distortion (Lacy & Stark, 2013; Schacter,
Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).
15. Further, Dr. LeBau's [sic] opinions about [K.G.’s] physical and
mental capacity were based exclusively on the Dubowski Chart
(copyright 1976). Although this chart was copyrighted by Dr. K.W.
Dubowski, and is included in both Dr. LeBeau's book on forensic
psychology, as well as numerous other non-peer reviewed books, there
is no basis for the specific signs and symptoms associated with the
BAC levels in the Dubowski chart. In addition, the BAC levels in each
category are so large that they are not useful for any given person. The
lower and upper limits differ by an average of .15 g% BAC; which is a
large difference in drinking quantity. Most importantly, I have not
been able to find any scientific basis for the signs and symptoms
attributed to the categories of BAC in the Dubowski chart.
16. Based upon the materials provided to me, it is my expert opinion
that a complete scientific evaluation of the role of alcohol intoxication
and alcohol-induced blackouts was not presented at the trial of Jeffrey
Marsalis.
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Affidavit of Dr. Fromme, para. 14-16 (emphasis added). (R. p. 443-444.)
b) The district court’s characterization of the issue
The plaintiff alleges that "counsel's [sic] performance was deficient
because they failed to challenge the testimony of Marc LeBeau
regarding the complaining witness's and Mr. Marsalis's blood alcohol
concentration." Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Mr. LeBeau's
testimony regarding the "Widmark formula," used for blood alcohol
estimation, and the "Dubowski chart" should not have been admitted
because they are not scientifically reliable and therefore in violation of
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702.
In addition, the evidence should not have been admitted because an
objection to their admissibility would have been sustained under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 403. As backing for his allegations the plaintiff has
included an article from The Champion, a periodical published by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. The Champion
article details the work of Dominick A. Labianca, Ph.D., a professor
emeritus at Brooklyn College, showing the lack of reliability of the
Widmark formula. The plaintiff therefore alleges that the information
contained in the article from The Champion would have refuted Dr.
LeBeau's testimony when presented by another expert.
The plaintiff alleges further that if the Widmark formula had not been
accepted, then the Dubowski chart also would not have been
admissible.
Order at p. 5. (R. p. 580.)
c)

The district court’s ruling

The district court’s ruling is as follows in full:
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, an expert
technical, or other specialized knowledge will
understand the evidence or to determine a
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
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may testify if "scientific,
assist the trier of fact to
fact in issue, a witness
experience, training, or

education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise:"
I.R.E. 702.
First, it is clear that Dr. LeBeau is in fact an expert and allowing him
to testify without objection was not an error by counsel. It is clearly
within sound trial strategy to not attack an expert who is in fact an
expert. Therefore, defense counsel's performance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
Second, the substance of Dr. LeBeau's testimony is not sufficiently in
question, as discussed below.
b. Whether Defense Counsel Should Have Objected to Dr.
LeBeau's Testimony under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403
Under Rule of Evidence 403, "evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...." I.R.E. 403.
Firstly, this is not a question of fact, but a question of law. Decisions
on evidentiary decisions fall squarely within the sound discretion of
the trial court.
Secondly, evidence may only be excluded if the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E.
403 (emphasis added). All evidence that serves to convict a defendant
is prejudicial to his or her case. In this instance, the probative value of
the evidence presented by the expert is high. While the average lay
person can likely tell when someone is drunk and even how drunk they
are, the average lay person will not know the line between when a
person will have memory problems and when they are so intoxicated
that they are in a stupor, which was a significant fact of consequence
in the trial.
'l'hirdly, the transcript is replete with questioning, cross-examination,
and examination of the expert witness's testimony. Counsel effectively
ruled out "date rape" drugs such as GHB, Catemine and Rohypnol,
which could be seen as exculpatory, (Second Amended Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Disposition of Second Amended Post
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Conviction Application, Ex. 1 p. 699-706). In addition, defense
counsel effectively cross-examined the State's expert regarding alcohol.
Specifically, defense counsel asked about vomiting after a certain level
of alcohol and discussed how drunk someone would have to be in order
to vomit, including speed of consumption. Id. at 709-11
When coupled with additional testimony regarding the length of time
the defendant and the victim were drinking and what they had to
drink, the jury could have found that the victim was suffering from
mixing hard alcohol with beer in order to become sick, which would
have acted to negate the State's position that the victim was drunk to
the point of blacking out. However, that is not the conclusion that the
jury reached.
Moreover, there is no requirement that counsel call an expert witness
to rebut the State's expert witness. Defense counsel already
ascertained from the State's expert that the Widmark formula and
Dubowski chart are not exact measurements, Id. at 684-87.
Based on the exhibits presented by the plaintiff in this case, the
defendant would not have been in a materially different position had
defense counsel presented another expert.
The Court cannot conclude that defense counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable, nor that at the time for the objection the
testimony was unfairly prejudicial. Defense counsel's performance at
trial did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and the
Court does not reach the second prong of the test as the first is refuted
by the record. Therefore, for the purposes of summary dismissal, the
Court finds no issue of material fact regarding counsel's performance
related to the expert witness, and summary dismissal is granted on
behalf of the State on this issue.
Order at p. 6-8 (bold emphasis in the original, underlined added). (R. p. 581-583.)
d) The court erred in dismissing this claim
To begin with, while the district court correctly characterizes the issues
raised by Petitioner, it never actually rules on them, substituting its own issues
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instead. To further explain, the district court initially correctly states that
Petitioner alleges that Mr. LeBeau’s testimony regarding the Widmark formula
and Dubowski chart should not have been admitted because they are not
scientifically reliable and are therefore in violation of I.R.E. 702.

In addition,

according to the district court, Petitioner alleges the evidence should have been
objected to under I.R.E. 403.
When it comes time to rule on these issues, the district court has turned
Petitioner’s claim into one of Mr.

LeBeau not being an expert at all and that

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to him testifying, period.

Petitioner of

course never made that claim, but regardless, the court ruled that Mr. LeBeau was
in fact an expert and that it is not error to allow him to testify without objection
and “[i]t is clearly within sound trial strategy to not attack an expert who is in fact
an expert.” (R. p. 581.)
The actual claim, that Mr. LeBeau’s testimony regarding the Widmark
formula and Dubowski chart was inadmissible under I.R.E. 702 and should have
been objected to, was not addressed by the court. Rather than determining whether
the evidence was scientifically reliable or not, the court simply moved on to the
I.R.E. 403 analysis and determined the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
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Then, while the district court specifically mentions The Champion article, it
disregards the affidavits of Petitioner’s experts and only tangentially refers to them
as his exhibits and incredibly holds that the defendant would not have been in a
materially different position had the defendant presented another expert.
Thus, since the district court did not actually address Petitioner’s allegations
the dismissal of this sub-claim must be reversed. Further, since the district court
simply ignores the evidence produced by Petitioner, this matter should actually be
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
To begin with, the evidence produced by Petitioner via his experts’ affidavits
show that the Widmark formula and the Dubowski chart are scientifically
unreliable, so Mr. LeBeau’s testimony about them was not admissible under I.R.E.
702. The problem begins with the Widmark formula and then gets bigger with the
leap it allows to the Dubowski chart and the stage of alcoholic influence that the
complaining witness was supposedly in.
But to start with the Widmark formula, according to Dr. Anstine, even Dr.
Dubowski stated that:
. . . it becomes clear that the speculative retrograde extrapolation of
the BAC to any point from an experimentally determined value must
be avoided in forensic practice, or so qualified by stated assumptions
that the exercise becomes pointless.
Affidavit of Dr. Anstine, para. 7. (R. p. 438.)
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Significantly, this warning is for extrapolating from a known BAC, which we
did not even have in our case. Dr. Dubowski identified some problems as assuming
the linearity of the presumed elimination rate and the wide range of said rate (.54
to .85 for females with .66 used as average). (R. p. 437-438.) Of course, Dr. Anstine
stated there are a myriad of parameters that affect one’s BAC. (R. p. 435.)
Again, Dr. Anstine concluded:
In summary, it is my opinion that the State relied too heavily on one
single technique, specifically the Widmark formula, and from these
speculative calculations made sweeping assumptions, based on the
Dubowski chart, concerning the levels of intoxication and its influence
on Mr. Marsalis and [K.G.]. Scientifically, there is no way to know
either of their levels of intoxication with any accuracy or certainty
based solely on Widmark calculations. Without knowing their level of
intoxication, any discussion concerning the "stages of alcoholic
influence" is complete speculation
Affidavit of Dr. Anstine, para. 8. (R. p. 438.)
Next was Dr. Fromme. Regarding Mr. LeBeau’s testimony, he first opined
that BAC estimations based on self-reports and eyewitness reports are of
questionable validity. (R. p. 443.) But more to the point, he again concluded:
15. Further, Dr. LeBau’s [sic] opinions about [K.G.’s] physical and
mental capacity were based exclusively on the Dubowski Chart
(copyright 1976). Although this chart was copyrighted by Dr. K.W.
Dubowski, and is included in both Dr. LeBeau's book on forensic
psychology, as well as numerous other non-peer reviewed books, there
is no basis for the specific signs and symptoms associated with the
BAC levels in the Dubowski chart. In addition, the BAC levels in each
category are so large that they are not useful for any given person. The
lower and upper limits differ by an average of .15 g% BAC; which is a
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large difference in drinking quantity. Most importantly, I have not
been able to find any scientific basis for the signs and symptoms
attributed to the categories of BAC in the Dubowski chart.
Affidavit of Dr. Fromme, para. 15. (R. p. 443-444.)
Petitioner asserts that had defense counsel brought a motion in limine with
the evidence of these or similar expert witnesses that the testimony of Mr. LeBeau
regarding the Widmark formula and/or the Dubowski chart (the bigger problem)
would not have been admitted under I.R.E. 702 as they are scientifically unreliable.
In the alternative, the evidence should have been excluded under I.R.E. 403. The
experts are expressing opinions such as “complete speculation” and unable “to find
any scientific basis” and so the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant from the
testimony regarding the Widmark formula and Dubowski chart is exceptionally
high and substantially outweighs the very low probative value.
Or, even if the evidence of the Widmark formula and the Dubowski chart
were admitted, defense counsel still should have called his own expert witnesses.
The court’s response to this is that defense counsel established on crossexamination that the Widmark formula and Dubowski chart were not exact
measurements.

Not an exact measurement is a far cry from learning that

Dubowski himself warned against even using the Widmark formula to do a more
mild version of what Mr. LeBeau was doing with it (warning against extrapolating
from a known BAC). Likewise, not an exact measurement is hardly the same as
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“there is no basis for the specific signs and symptoms associated with the BAC
levels in the Dubowski chart.”
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the district court really understands the
issue when it comments about “the State's position that the victim was drunk to the
point of blacking out.” The state’s position was that the victim was drunk to the
point of stupor or unconsciousness. The defense’s position was that the victim had
consensual sex, but did not remember it because she was in a blackout.
Regardless, by not calling an expert witness, the defense was unable to
meaningfully put on this defense at trial. All the jury learned about blackouts was
from Mr. LeBeau, who testified that blackouts did not start to occur until .25 on the
Dubowski chart, which also coincided with where stupor began on the Dubowski
chart. (Trial Tr. p. 660, 664.) So that did not provide a defense at all.
Had defense counsel called an expert on alcohol induced blackouts like Dr.
Fromme, he would have testified that while blackouts can occur at BACs as low as
.07, most occur at BACs of .15 and higher. Dr. Fromme would have also explained
that alcohol-induced blackouts are simply amnesia for all or part of a drinking
episode.

Again, a person in a blackout is able to engage in complex activities,

including engaging in conversation, driving, or having sexual intercourse, they are
simply not forming memories for those events. There are no observable signs that
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another person is in a blackout, so their actions may be seen as conscious and
volitional to an observer.
Dr. Fromme would have testified that based on K.G.’s prior blackouts which
indicate her genetic predisposition to alcohol-induced blackouts:
13. I conclude with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that
[K.G.] was experiencing both fragmentary and en bloc blackouts
during the night of October 9, 2005 and the early morning hours of
October 10, 2005. . . .
Affidavit of Dr. Fromme, para. 13. (R. p. 443.)
To reiterate the court’s ruling on the defense calling expert witnesses, it was:
Based on the exhibits presented by the plaintiff in this case, the
defendant would not have been in a materially different position had
defense counsel presented another expert.
Order, p. 7. (R. p. 582.)
Other than the conclusory statement, the court does not even attempt to
explain how Mr. Marsalis would not have been better off with expert witnesses than
without. Had they been called, the jury would have not just learned the state’s side
of things, but would have learned that BAC extrapolation based on the Widmark
formula was complete speculation which means so is then using the Dubowski chart
for stages of alcohol influence. They also would have learned that there is no
scientific basis for the Dubowski chart. It was argued in the post-conviction that
defense counsel tried to argue to the jury that the Dubowski chart was garbage
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based on his questioning of Mr. LeBeau that vomiting occurred only at .25 and
above according to the Dubowski chart (the questioning noted by the court), but
defense counsel had no evidence it was garbage. (R. p. 424-425.)
More importantly, the jury would have learned the scientific basis for the
blackout defense from an expert in them, to wit, what a blackout was, how people
acted in them, and the expert opinion that K.G. experienced one that night.
Contrary to the court’s ruling, Petitioner would be in a materially different
position had his attorney called expert witnesses. He would have been in trial with
a viable defense, which is not where he was in his actual trial without expert
witnesses.
2)

Failure to call a witness favorable to the defense
a)

Petitioner’s claim and the evidence in the post-conviction

The Second Amended Petition explained that prior to trial, the defense hired
an investigator who interviewed John Hampton, a passenger in the taxi (shuttle
van) taken by Petitioner and the complaining witness, and attached the transcript
of that interview. (R. p. 291.) Had he been called as a witness, Mr. Hampton would
have testified that the victim was not forced into the taxi, that there was no
argument of any sort between the Petitioner and her, and when they left the cab
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neither appeared to have trouble getting out the cab or walking after exiting the
cab. (R. p. 291.)
This would have directly controverted the state’s two trial witnesses who
testified that the victim was drunk, almost passed out during the cab ride home and
that she had trouble walking before she entered the cab and when she exited the
cab in Sun Valley. (R. p. 292.)

Defense counsel had barely any questions for these

witnesses and did not challenge their accounts despite knowing about the report
from a third occupant of the cab who directly contradicted their version of the
events. (R. p. 292.) In closing argument, the prosecutor stressed the significance of
the taxi driver’s testimony as corroboration for the condition of the complaining
witness. (R. p. 293.)
Attached to the Petitioner’s Reply to the State’s Amended Memorandum to
Dismiss the Second Amended Petition was the Declaration of [Attorney] Charles F.
Peterson.

He stated that a reasonably prudent trial counsel under those

circumstances would have called the witness. (R. p. 570.)

This

is

because

the

state’s case rested on the notion that it was obvious to Petitioner that the
complaining witness was intoxicated and incapable of consenting to sex. Evidence
that she was unable to stand on her own from the state witnesses buttressed that
notion and was left almost entirely uncontroverted by defense counsel. (R. p. 570571.)

28

Attorney Peterson continued by stating there was no strategic reason for not
calling Mr. Hampton as a defense witness. The failure to call him is not excused by
any strategy as the state’s witnesses had confirmed the premise of the case, that the
victim was too drunk to consent. Providing a witness who saw her leave the club in
a van and depart under her own ability would have countered the state’s evidence.
(R. p. 571.)
b)

The district court’s ruling

The district court ruled as follows in full:
Plaintiff contends that defense counsel should have called John
Hampton to testify at trial and provided a transcript of what Mr.
Hampton would have testified to. (Second Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief, Ex. B). One of the State's witnesses was the cab
driver, the only person completely sober in the cab. By contrast, Mr.
Hampton was sitting in the middle seat in front of the defendant and
victim, and expressly stated in his interview that he wasn't paying
attention to the defendant and victim. Id. at 4.
A witness who wasn't paying attention and had been drinking that
night is not a reliable witness at trial and it is objectively reasonable to
avoid calling this person as a witness. This becomes even more true
when the only sober person in the car directly contradicts the
testimony of the drunk witness who wasn't paying attention. In short,
calling Mr. Hampton would have had no effect on the outcome of the
case.
Therefore, even in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no
issue of material fact concerning defense counsel's decision at trial to
not call Mr. Hampton. Defense counsel's judgment was objectively
reasonable and the Court again does not address the second prong of
the test because of the failure in the first prong. Summary dismissal is
granted as to this cause of action.
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Order at p. 8-9. (R. p. 583-584.)
c)

The district court erred in dismissing the claim

First, the court is making a credibility determination in a summary
proceeding and essentially ruling that because it does not believe Mr. Hampton
defense counsel did not need to call him.
That is what an evidentiary hearing is for. There, the significance of the fact
that Mr. Hampton was sitting in front of Mr. Marsalis and the complaining witness
can be explored, along with the fact that the two witnesses believed by the court
were sitting even farther forward. Likewise, why Mr. Hampton was not paying
attention can also be addressed, to wit, whether he was not paying attention
because there was nothing to pay attention to.
Next, the court holds that not calling a witness is objectively reasonable
without addressing the opinion of the attorney opining as an expert that it fell
below the standard of effective trial counsel. As the attorney stated, the state’s
evidence of the taxi ride was significant, and it needed to be controverted so there
was no excuse not to.
Finally, the court confuses the standards when it states that it is not
addressing the prejudice prong after it does that very thing when it states that not
calling Mr. Hampton did not affect the outcome of the trial. But this is only true if
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the court’s credibility determination is true. If the jury believed Mr. Hampton
(possible since the court was fine with K.G.’s reliability despite her drinking), and
particularly if Mr. LeBeau had not testified and/or if defense had called its expert
witnesses, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, dismissal
of this claim must be reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on it.
3)

Failure to advise Petitioner of the time limits for trial in the Interstate
Agreement on Detainer statute and the remedies available for breach
of that statute.
a)

The claim and the arguments in the post-conviction

The Second Amended Petition alleged as follows:
39. While Petitioner was released on bail from the charges in the
underlying criminal case in Idaho, he was charged with separate
offenses alleged to have occurred in the State of Pennsylvania.
40. Petitioner was tried first in the State of Pennsylvania, convicted
and sentenced to prison.
41. While he was housed in the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney filed a Request
for Temporary Custody on April l7, 2008. See Exhibit C, attached
hereto. The document indicates that Blaine County "propose[s] to bring
this person to trial on the indictment within the time specified in
Article IV(c) of the Agreement."
42. While the document reflects that a copy must be sent to the
prisoner, Petitioner did not receive a copy of this document via mail.
43. Petitioner was taken to Court in Pennsylvania on this request and
was eventually returned to Idaho on August 18, 2008, and he appeared
in court in Blaine County on August 19, 2008.

31

44. The Interstate Detainer Statute, I.C. § 19-5001 et. seq. contains
specific time limits on when a defendant must be brought to trial.
Specifically, a trial must begin with 120 days of a defendant's arrival
in the receiving state. "In respect of any proceeding made possible by
this paragraph, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty
(120) days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for
good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any
necessary or reasonable continuance." I.C. § 19-5001(d)(3).2
[footnote]
2Note that this statute corresponds to Article
IV(c) of the agreement referenced in Exhibit C.
45. Defense counsel failed to discuss with Petitioner the rights set forth
in this statute and Petitioner was thus unaware of his rights to a
speedy trial under this detainer agreement.
46. By failing to inform Petitioner of these rights, any waiver of time
entered by Petitioner related to his rights under the Detainer
agreement was not knowing and voluntary.
47. The 120 day time limit for trial expired on December 17, 2008.
48. At a scheduling conference on December 1, 2008, held in chambers
with Petitioner present, there was some discussion concerning the time
for trial and the effect of the detainer. The prosecutor Mr. Thomas
indicated a time period of 180 days and noted this would expire on
February 19, 2009. (See, partial transcript of status conference
attached hereto as Exhibit D.) No time waiver was entered on that
date.
49. The Court minutes reflect that there was a hearing held on
December 15, 2008, which lasted approximately 3 minutes. While
there is no transcript of that proceeding, the minutes reflect that
Petitioner signed a speedy trial waiver. That written waiver does not
appear to be in the Clerk's Record. Indeed, the attorneys appear to
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have believed that the time for trial under the detainer did not expire
until February 19, 2009.
50. Under the Detainer Agreement, any extension beyond the time
limit had to have been made in open court. Because Petitioner was
never advised of these rights, the record in the criminal proceedings
does not reflect that the required findings were made to permit a
showing of waiver or that there was a proper extension of the 120 day
time limit in this case.
51. Had trial counsel advised Petitioner of these rights, Petitioner
would have been entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him in
the State of Idaho as there was no valid waiver of the extension of the
120 day time limit for trial.
52. Defense counsel failed to discuss with Petitioner, the rights set
forth in this statute.
53. By failing to inform Petitioner of these rights, any waiver of time
entered by Petitioner was not knowing and voluntary.
Second Amended Petition, p. 13-17. (R. p. 293-296.)
The trial that was continued had been set for January 5, 2009. (R. p. 548549.)
In its Second Amended Memorandum, the state explained that on December
1, 2008, a hearing was held in which the state made counsel and the court aware of
an additional 300—400 pages of state’s discovery documents that not been provided
to defense counsel (and still was not provided at that time), including DNA analysis
which matched Mr. Marsalis. (R. p. 465.) Further, due to the press coverage a
change of venue to Ada County was discussed, as well as speedy trial (which was
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believed to be 180 days). (R. p. 465-466.) After the hearing, a stipulation for change
of venue was entered into on December 5, 2008 between state and defense counsel.
(R. p. 466.) A stipulation to continue jury trial was signed and an Order granting
the continuance was entered on December 8, 2008. (R. p. 466.)
On December 9, 2008, a waiver of speedy trial was signed by Mr. Marsalis.
(R. p. 466.) An email exchange between the district judge and defense counsel
showed the judge wanted to confirm the signature was in fact Mr. Marsalis’ and
that he personally authorized the waiver. (R. p. 466.) On December 15, 2008, a
hearing was held where the parties discussed the speedy trial waiver and change of
venue. (R. p. 466.) The case was ultimately transferred to Ada County and set for
trial on April 20, 2009. (R. p. 466.)
The state argued in its Second Amended Memorandum:
It is clear from the record that there were multiple reasons for the
continuance which, in fact, were in the interests of the Petitioner. The
record indicates Petitioner was aware of these reasons, they were
discussed on the record with counsel and Petitioner present and signed
documents waiving speedy trial, agreeing to a trial continuance and a
change of venue were filed in the case.
Petitioner's claim does not meet the standards necessary to receive
relief under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Idaho has explicitly adopted
this standard. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365,
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368 (1994). "[C]ounsel's performance must have been so
incompetent that the trial can not be relied upon as having
produced a just result. It is for the accused to show that counsel
made serious errors and that the errors resulted in actual
prejudice." Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368 (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). The two tests which must be met in
order to be entitled to relief are: (1) a showing that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) a showing that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. McCoy v. State, 129
Idaho 70, 76, 921 P.2d 1194, 1200 (1996).
Even if Petitioner was erroneously given information that speedy trial
was 180 days versus 120 days from the time he was brought back to
Idaho, Petitioner waived these rights to take advantage of receiving
additional discovery materials including a DNA semen blood match
and the favorable change of venue. Under either theory the claim
should be dismissed. Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to show
prejudice as to the erroneous information. If the trial would have gone
forward prior to the 120 day speedy trial limit it would have been to
the detriment of the Petitioner as his attorney was not aware until 10
days before the 120 day time period expired that his client, Marsalis,
had been biologically connected to the rape victim through a DNA
semen/blood analysis. In fact he had not received the report through
discovery at that point. Had the trial occurred in the 120 day
timeframe Petitioner once again would have been at a disadvantage
due to the case being tried in Blaine County where considerable press
coverage had been afforded the case. Both the waiver of speedy trial
and to the change of venue were at the request of and on behalf
of the Petitioner which would constitute good cause and provide for a
continuance of the trial beyond the 120 day detainer time limit.
Second Amended Memorandum p. 13-14. (R. p. 466-467.)
b)

The district court’s ruling

The district court’s exact ruling, while lengthy, is important to this issue.

35

The State's detainer request form (Addressment on Detainer's Form V)
specifically states that the request for the plaintiff was made under
Article IV(a) of the Agreement on Detainers. Article IV corresponds to
Idaho Code § 19-5001(d). The relevant sections of Idaho Code § 195001(d) state:
(3) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this
paragraph, trial shall be commenced within one hundred
twenty (120) days of the arrival of the prisoner in the
receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having
jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance.
(4) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to
deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to
contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph
(1) of this subsection, but such delivery may not be
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive
authority of the sending state has not affirmatively
consented to or ordered such delivery.
(5) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being
returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to
subsection (e)(5) of this section, such indictment, information, or
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court
shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Idaho Code § 19-5001(d)(1), (3)-(5). However, the provisions of this
detainer can be waived for “good cause" in a variety of ways. New York
v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000). "What suffices for waivers depends on
the nature of the right at issue" Id. For fundamental rights, the
defendant must be fully informed in order to waive his rights, but
other rights may be waived by counsel. Id. Scheduling issues are
"plainly among those [rights]" under the control of defense counsel. Id.
at 115.
As stated above, although the State indicated that it believed it had
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180 days to prosecute the offense, the actual
pursuant to subsection (3).

time was 120 days

Scheduling is not a fundamental right. As this was not a fundamental
right, there is no error in defense counsel exercising that right. The
rule also addresses continuances granted for "good cause." However,
where there is an agreement regarding continuation, there is no
requirement to show "good cause." Id. at 116 n.l. Moreover, even
though "good cause" did not need to be shown because of the
agreement, there was good cause shown on the record. Therefore,
defense counsel effectively, but properly, waived the plaintiffs right to
trial within 120 days.
Moreover, finding that the trial was not just has little to do with
procedural safeguards in this instance. The purpose of the Interstate
Act on Detainers (IAD) was to prevent prosecutors from interfering
with a prisoner's treatment while incarcerated elsewhere and to force
either dismissal or prosecution, so that a prisoner could clear his
record. See Fulgham v. State, 400 P.3d 775, 778 (Okla. Crim. App.
2016) (citing Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985). Therefore the
key section of Idaho Code § 19-5001(d) is section (5). Section (5)
contains the substantive right that the creators of the IAD intended to
create, which requires dismissal of the charges when a defendant is
returned to his original place of imprisonment. This was not that type
of case. The plaintiff was never returned to his state of incarceration
prior to being convicted.
In Fulgham, the defendant had been brought to the state some 565
days prior to trial and trial had been continued without a complete
record showing good cause for every continuance. The Oklahoma
Court, citing Hill, stated that waiver can occur from more than
affirmative conduct because
Such an approach would enable defendants to escape
justice by willingly accepting treatment inconsistent with the
IAD's time limits, and the recanting later on. Nothing in the
IAD requires or even suggests a distinction between waiver
proposed and waiver agreed to. In light of its potential for abuse-
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-and given the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice--we
decline to adopt it.
Fulgham, 400 P.3d at 779 (citing Hill, 528 U.S. at 118).
The Strickland standard states that "counsel's performance must have
been so incompetent that trial cannot be relied upon as having a just
result." Such is not the case before the Court, even in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Defense counsel made a proper decision
regarding the plaintiff’s rights, as is permissible for a non-fundamental
right, in order to ensure a just trial. The Court can find no error in
such a decision.
Even if defense counsel did not know of the 120 day time limit, his
behavior did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness,
nor does the waiver affect the outcome at trial. The venue of the trial
needed to be changed to ensure a substantive right would be granted,
and the plaintiff would have been more severely prejudiced by a failure
to continue the trial than he is by supposition the defense counsel did
not know the correct time frame for trial.
Moreover, finding that the trial was not just has little to do with
procedural safeguards in this instance. Good cause was clearly shown
because delay was needed to ensure an unbiased jury for the plaintiff.
The good cause was clearly shown on the record, and the case was
transferred to Ada County for the plaintiff’s benefit.
Therefore, counsel's performance was not below an objectively
reasonable standard and the motion for summary dismissal is granted
on behalf of the State on the issue of interstate detainer.
Order, p. 9-12 (emphasis added). (R. p. 584-587.)
c)

The district court erred in dismissing this claim

In short, this claim was dismissed by the court without any notice at all of
the grounds for dismissal.
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As the Idaho Supreme Court held in DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599 (2009):
. . . if the State moves to dismiss a petition under Idaho Code § 19–
4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on a ground not asserted by
the State in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice
required by Section 19–4906(b).
Id. at p. 602.
Here, Mr. Marsalis alleged in his petition that he had not been informed by
his attorney of his right to trial within 120 days under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers and thus his waiver of his speedy trial rights was invalid. Thus, the
argument went, had he been advised of his rights, he would have been entitled to
dismissal of the charges since there was no valid waiver.
In response, the state argued that Mr. Marsalis did enter a valid waiver and
agreed to the continuance which was in his interest. The state further argued that
even if he was erroneously advised that the speedy trial time was 180 instead of 120
days he still waived these rights to take advantage of receiving additional discovery.
Of course, the district court did not dismiss this claim on grounds urged by
the state. Rather, the district court dismissed the claim, not because Mr. Marsalis
had waived his speedy trial rights, but because his attorney had effectively, but
properly, waived Mr. Marsalis’ speedy trial rights for him. The court held that the
scheduling of the trial was not a fundamental right and so Petitioner’s attorney
exercised that right for him.
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The court’s ground for dismissal, to wit, that Mr. Marsalis had no personal
right to exercise his right to a speedy trial and his attorney could validly waive it for
him, is a completely different argument raised for the first time by the district
court. In fact, the state’s recitation of the proceedings discussed a diametrically
opposed procedure in the criminal court, to wit, a district court ensuring that the
criminal defendant personally signed the speedy trial waiver.
Likewise, to the extent that it is part of its ruling, the district court’s
comments addressing the purpose of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and
whether the trial was just or not in relation to the procedural safeguards was never
mentioned by the state in its arguments regarding summary dismissal.
In short, the petition and the state’s motion for summary dismissal addressed
defense counsel’s failure to advise Petitioner about the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers 120 day time limit and whether or not Petitioner’s waiver was
accordingly valid or invalid.
The district court, on the other hand, addressed whether or not the criminal
defendant even has a personal right to exercise regarding speedy trial under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers and held he did not and so counsel was not
ineffective for exercising that right for him by waiving it. For

this

reason,

the

court’s dismissal of this claim must be reversed and remanded to the district court
to give Petitioner 20 days to respond to the district court’s grounds for dismissal.
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Appellant points out that even assuming arguendo that the district court is
correct and an attorney is able to validly waive the 120 day time limit for a
defendant and it was validly done so in this case, the district court’s further
conclusion is still wrong that counsel was not ineffective if defense counsel waived
the 120 day time limit without knowing about it.
Again, the court held:
Even if defense counsel did not know of the 120 day time limit, his
behavior did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness,
nor does the waiver affect the outcome at trial. The venue of the trial
needed to be changed to ensure a substantive right would be granted,
and the plaintiff would have been more severely prejudiced by a failure
to continue the trial than he is by supposition the defense counsel did
not know the correct time frame for trial.
Order at p. 11 (emphasis added). (R. p. 586.)
First, Petitioner would have been better served with an attorney who knew of
the time limits rather than by one who did not. While it should go without saying
but apparently cannot, an attorney does need to know about relevant time limits.
Petitioner did provide uncontroverted proof of this below.
The Declaration of Charles F. Peterson stated that the lawyers in this case
had a duty to be aware of the time limitations and the failure to be aware of the
limits fell before the standard of care for trial defense counsel. (R. p. 571-572.)
Second, if the attorney knew of the 120 day time limit and refused to waive
the speedy trial right and refused to move to continue the case and the case had not
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been tried, the case would have been dismissed with prejudice. State v. Knauff, 115
Idaho 74 (Ct.App. 1988); e.g. State v. Richardson, 163 Idaho 523 (Ct. App. 2018).
Cleary, Petitioner would have been better off with the case against him dismissed
with prejudice.
Third, if the attorney knew of the 120 day time limit and refused to waive the
speedy trial right and refused to move to continue the case, the case would have
been tried because the state would not move for a continuance.

Petitioner still

would have been better off as explained below.
In its Second Amended Memorandum the state argued Petitioner was not
prejudiced because if trial went forward within 120 days his attorney would not
have been aware until 10 days prior about the DNA evidence and he would have
been at a disadvantage being tried in Blaine County given the press coverage and
both the waiver of speedy trial and the change of venue were at the request of and
on the behalf of the Petitioner.
At the hearing on the motion for summary dismissal the prosecutor again
pointed out that the continuance and the change of venue were at the request of and
on behalf of the petitioner, but that the state did agree to them. (Tr., Marsalis v.
State, 9/5/17, p. 17.) The prosecutor also again pointed out that had Mr. Marsalis
not waived his speedy trial rights and proceeded to trial he would not have had the
benefit of having his own expert review the DNA evidence that he had just received
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and also, it would have kept the trial in Blaine County where there had been
negative press. (Tr., Marsalis v. State, 9/5/17, p. 17-18.)
The prosecutor continued:
The State was ready to proceed. We weren’t seeking a continuance. We
weren’t seeking necessarily the change of venue. We ultimately agreed
to that, but the State was ready to proceed with the trial. So this idea
that somehow we would have dismissed and had to refile, we would
have just pushed the Court to proceed with the trial if, in fact, Mr.
Marshals [Marsalis] did not want to waive his speedy trial.
Tr., Marsalis v. State, 9/5/17, p. 18, lns. 5-12.
The state’s claims that it was ready to proceed to trial seem incredible. The
timeline is important here. The trial was set for January 5, 2009, the speedy trial
issue first came up in court on December 1, 2008, the stipulation to continue the
trial was filed on December 5, 2008, the court entered its order continuing the trial
on December 8, 2008, and the 120 day speedy trial clock ran on December 17, 2008.
The prosecutor’s statements that the state was ready for trial can only refer
to proceeding with the established trial setting, but that was beyond the 120 day
speedy trial clock. Otherwise, had defense counsel known the speedy trial time was
120 rather than 180 days and refused to stipulate to a continuance on December 5,
2008, there would have been less than two weeks to set a jury trial and call in a jury
pool sufficiently large enough to empanel a jury in a high profile case in Blaine
County.

The fact that it was just before the holidays would only make matters

worse.
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Likewise, the prosecutor’s repeated assurances that the state was ready to
proceed sounds like so much wishful thinking. On December 1, 2008, the state was
explaining to the court that three or four of its witnesses are from out of state. (R.
p. 543.)

The state certainly did not produce evidence below in the post-conviction

(it was just argument by the prosecutor) that it could have really had gotten its out
of town witnesses to trial on such short notice before the holidays.

This is

particularly true for Mr. LeBeau, the state’s expert discussed above, who was the
Unit Chief of the Chemistry Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia. (R. p. 460.)

As is

clear from the issue above, the trial would have been significantly different without
his testimony. Likewise, the cab driver discussed above lived in Yuma, Arizona at
the time of trial. (Trial tr., p. 456.)
The state also repeatedly argues about what an advantage it was for Mr.
Marsalis to receive the 300-400 pages of discovery including DNA he was first
alerted to (but not given) on December 1, 2008, and what a disadvantage it would
have been to go to trial without his own expert looking at it. However, the state
does not explain why its late disclosure (even with a January trial setting) was not
a discovery violation and so how the evidence was admissible to begin with. So
really, the state would have been going to trial without the DNA evidence, or at the
very least, this is a reason why summary dismissal of this issue cannot simply be
affirmed but evidence on it is required.
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Further, the district court’s complaints about enforcing the Interstate
Agreements on Detainers are contrary to Idaho law. In State v. Knauff, 115 Idaho
74 (Ct.App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated a conviction and directed an
order of dismissal with prejudice where the 120 day time limit was exceeded by 33
days. Of course there, the defendant’s attorney was protecting his client’s speedy
trial rights rather than sharing in what the Court of Appeals called “a regrettable
misunderstanding of the applicable statutory time period.” Id. at 77.
To conclude, the dismissal of this claim must be reversed and this claim
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, or at the very least for
further summary dismissal proceedings so that Petitioner can have an opportunity
to respond.
4)

Cumulative instances of ineffective assistance of counsel

In the Second Amended Petition it was asserted that even if the above subclaims do not warrant relief individually, they do when the cumulative impact is
considered. (R. p. 296.)
The court of course dismissed this claim since it found none of the allegations
to have been ineffective assistance of counsel. (R. p. 587.)
Appellant asserts that since the district court erred regarding the individual
sub-claims, it erred regarding the cumulative error claim as well and its dismissal
must be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons above stated, Appellant respectfully requests the
district court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief be
reversed and remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing and/or for
further summary dismissal proceedings on appropriate claims.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2018.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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